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Abstract
Privatisation, i.e. the transfer of ownership and control of state-owned
enterprises, is a worldwide phenomenon. Which political, economic and
institutional factors are shaping this process? This paper addresses the
issue presenting new evidence from a sample of 49 countries. From an
empirical analysis of the period 1977-96, the decision to privatise and the
choice of privatisation method appear to be influenced by the governing
political majority and public sector budget constraints, while the success of
privatisation in terms of revenues and stakes sold requires suitable
institutions and developed capital markets.
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Privatisation, i.e. the transfer of ownership and control of State-owned enterprise (SOE),1
is a major trend in industrial countries, transition economies and emerging countries. The
process began in the late Seventies, with the Thatcher government in Great Britain, and spread
across countries and continents to become a distinguishing feature of ﬁn de sicle capitalism.
Privatisations are now common to most countries and occur across geographical regions and
sectors. From 1977 to 1997, 1,865 deals in more than 100 countries worth approximately
US$750bn were reported. According to the World Bank, global SOE value added decreased on
average from 9% to 6% of GDP in the 1978-91 period. Privatisation also had a tremendous
impact on ﬁnancial markets: in July 1998 privatised SOEs boasted a market capitalisation
worth US$1.5trn (Megginson - Netter [32]).
Nevertheless, few governments have completely transferred ownership and control of SOEs
to the private sector. In the reported public oﬀerings between 1977-1996, the majority of stock
was sold in only 41% of the 317 companies being considered, and it never happened in 18 out of
41 countries. This rough evidence indicates that control is still very much in State hands and
that partial or incomplete sales are a common feature of privatisation processes. Furthermore,
we observe systematic diﬀerences in privatisation methods. Some countries typically bypass
security markets opting for private placements to institutional investors, while others try to
widen ownership by large share oﬀerings.
Why do governments privatise? Why do some countries accomplish large scale privatisation
programmes, and others never privatise at all? Moreover, how do governments privatise? Why
do some governments privatise big stakes in SOEs, while others stick to partial privatisation?
Why do governments let privatised ﬁrms go public?
This paper provides some tentative answers to these important questions.
To address these issues we set forth two deﬁnitions that are instrumental to the statistical
analysis of the data. The quantity of privatisations in a given country is deﬁned in terms of
(i) the number of sales relative to the number of domestic listed ﬁrms and (ii) revenues per
capita. The quality of privatisations is deﬁned in terms of (i) the percentage of stock sold and
(ii) public oﬀers as a percentage of total sales. With regard to quantity, we will examine the
1Some authors deﬁne privatisation in a broader sense, as the downsizing of the economic activity of the State
(LSV [30]). Actually, in many countries over the last 20 years, the State withdrew from the public provision of
private and public goods and services. But this process very often went beyond the privatisation as we deﬁne
it, namely as the transfer of ownership and control of State-owned enterprise. In some cases (from the USA
to Europe and Italy) the State outsourced the provision of goods and services to private ﬁrms. In other cases
(e.g. in Middle East but also in Europe) the State liberalised the entry of private ﬁrms into former monopolistic
industries, but maintained the public ownership and control of SOEs. In the two latter cases, no transfer of
ownership took place, even if the process under review implied a greater role of the private sector in the economic
system.factors that may trigger the privatisation process, trying to explain why some countries have
privatised more extensively than others. Looking at quality, we will try to ﬁnd out possible
explanations for the persistence of partial privatisation and to identify the reasons underlying
the choice of privatisation method. Although we will construct a quality measure, we will
not express judgments on the ultimate results of privatisations. The evaluation of the overall
welfare eﬀects of privatisation in terms of performance, eﬃciency, and redistribution among
stakeholders cannot be carried out with reference to a few indicators related to the structure
of the placements.
We try to account for diﬀerences in the quantity and quality variables across countries by
testing several competing theories regarding the determinants of privatisation.
It is widely recognised that privatisation has strong political underpinnings; it is therefore
important to bring a government’s ideological preferences and budget constraints into the
analysis. It is often stated that right wing governments are more prone to privatise: a rationale
for this preference is the creation of a middle class of small capitalists more inclined - as
shareholders - to support market-oriented policies and to vote with the right in future (Vickers -
Yarrow [42] , Biais - Perotti [3]). Moreover, public ﬁnance theoretically matters in privatisation:
ﬁnancially distressed governments need to sell to improve their budgets. Finally, as shown by
recent literature on the political economy of privatisation, governments also face credibility
constraints. They need to marshal the support of domestic and international investors over
time and establish their reputations in terms of commitment to privatisation (Branco - Mello
[5], Perotti [35]). The credibility of governments should therefore matter in the economic
success of privatisation.
A strand of literature in empirical corporate ﬁnance has shown that legal protection of
investors aﬀects the development of ﬁnancial markets and ownership structures (La Porta -
Lopez-de-Silanes - Shleifer - Vishny (henceforth LLSV) [25], [26]). Legal protection could
also matter in privatisation: governments should be concerned about the legal protection of
investors in privatised ﬁrms, mostly when they opt for large ﬂotations to create a population of
widespread shareholders. Financial market development could aﬀect the quantity and quality of
privatisation. Indeed, stock market liquidity facilitates divestiture since it provides monitoring
and the aggregation of information (H¨ olmstrom - Tirole [17], Faure-Grimaud [12]). Where
ﬁnancial markets are well developed and eﬃcient, governments should privatise more as there
is less risk of shareholders being expropriated by managers.
Our empirical testing of the theories is based on a dataset that we assembled and which
refers to a sample of 49 countries. Our main results can be summarised as follows.
The quantity regressions show that the number of sales in a country is inﬂuenced by political
factors and by government budget constraints. In line with conventional wisdom, governments
3supported by conservative coalitions are more willing to privatise the economy; moreover,
pre-privatisation ﬁscal deﬁcits appear to be an important factor in triggering divestitures: gov-
ernments with hard budget constraints privatise more. The volume of a countrys privatisations
in terms of revenues per capita appears to be strongly correlated with ﬁnancial market devel-
opment and government credibility. Liquid capital markets allow governments to obtain the
full market value of the company sold; the same occurs whenever government credibility is
suﬃciently high. In countries with less developed capital markets and with a higher political
risk privatisations appear to be less successful in terms of proceeds. A government operating in
this context and wanting to maximise revenues should therefore consider ﬂoating the company
abroad or cross-listing shares. These results on quantity suggest a quite clear distinction be-
tween the factors inﬂuencing sales and revenues: sales are explained by supply factors basically
related to governments preferences and budget constraints; revenues depend largely upon de-
mand factors, such as ﬁnancial markets development, that governments are unable to control,
at least in the short run.
Turning to quality measures, we show that the willingness of governments to relinquish
control - proxied by the stake privatised - is particularly inﬂuenced by legal institutions and
by the commitment of governments to privatise. In particular, larger stakes are privatised
in countries that aﬀord extensive legal protection to shareholders and where eﬃcient stock
markets are operational, suggesting that a government might be more willing to relinquish
control in a context where the owners of newly privatised ﬁrms do not risk being expropriated
by managers. Alternatively, governments sell larger stakes when the need to discount against
future uncertainty in terms of legal protection is lower. Furthermore, recent literature on
privatisation suggests that partial privatisations - and underpricing - signal commitment in
conditions of uncertainty. If investors believe that the government will not implement a policy
reversal, then partial privatisations will be less frequent. This prediction seems conﬁrmed by
our data: indeed, credibility provides a substantial premium in terms of privatised stock.
We single out an important political determinant in the choice of the privatisation method.
The frequency of large share oﬀerings is highly correlated with conservative-backed govern-
ments. This evidence provides support for the Thatcherian view that privatisation might be
designed to foster the emergence of a peoples capitalism. The privatisation method is crucial
since a public oﬀering - often with underpricing - represents a necessary condition to ensure
widespread share ownership, increasing the cost of future nationalisation by left wing govern-
ments. Right-wing governments with hard budget constraints could face a diﬃcult trade-oﬀ
between achieving the political objective of privatisation and revenue maximisation. The fre-
quency of private sales increases in the context of ﬁscal deﬁcits, indicating that ﬁnancially
distressed governments typically choose to sell control and the associated beneﬁts to private
4investors. Finally, we ﬁnd that the French civil law tradition is related to a higher frequency
of direct sales. POs are less frequent in countries where there is a concentration of share own-
ership. The political preference of governments may therefore clash with prevailing ownership
structures.
The paper is organised as follows: section 2 brieﬂy presents the related literature; section
3 describes the dependent variables of the empirical analysis; section 4 states the theoretical
hypotheses being tested; section 5 describes the data; section 6 presents the empirical results.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Related Literature
From the early Eighties, privatisation programmes have inspired an extensive body of literature
on the rationale and the objectives of sell-oﬀs, on their determinants and eﬀects and, more
recently, on their political dimension (Laﬀont - Meleu [22], Yarrow - Jasinski [44], Vickers -
Yarrow [42]). In this literature, empirical studies are signiﬁcant. However, they are basically
case studies at the country or sector level, as the quality of the data does not allow for cross-
country investigation (see Megginson - Netter [32] for an excellent survey). To our knowledge,
few empirical papers have dealt with privatisations on a world scale. Jones et al. [20] study
underpricing in 137 privatised companies in 34 countries and ﬁnd evidence that it is more
frequent where governments need to gain domestic political support. Megginson - Nash - Van
Randerborgh [31] compare the ﬁnancial and operating performance of newly privatised ﬁrms
in 18 countries and ﬁnd substantial improvements in terms of turnover, proﬁtability, capital
investment and overall eﬃciency. Galal et al. [13] study the eﬀects of 12 privatisations in Chile,
Malaysia, Mexico, and United Kingdom, identifying gains and losses due to privatisations, and
ﬁnding that, in most cases, the net eﬀects were positive for the enterprise and for the national
economy.
3 The quantity and quality of privatisations
A ﬁrst step in our analysis is to ﬁnd quantitative indicators about the extent and volume of
State assets disposal by country, deﬁned as the ”quantity of privatisations. We use two measures
for quantity. The ﬁrst variable (SALES) looks at the number of public oﬀers (henceforth PO)
and private sales (henceforth PS), scaled by the number of domestic listed ﬁrms. The second
variable (REVENUES) is based on the total proceeds from those sales in US$ billions 1996 per
country, scaled by the population.2
2Revenues could be alternatively scaled by GNP. Using this variable as dependent variable in the regression
anlysis, we obtained interesting results by controlling for the (natural log of) GNP, but multicollinearity renders
5The two variables are equally important and complement each other. The number of sales
relative to domestic ﬁrms measures the extent of privatisation and proxies the willingness
of incumbent governments to privatise the economy. In this respect, it is important to use
privatisation transactions and not privatised companies as the unit of analysis. The fact that a
company is sold in multiple tranches is important information about the extent of privatisation
since bigger companies are typically sold in a sequence of issues.
Although useful to gauge the extent of divestiture, the number of sales has to be comple-
mented by a measure of the volume of one countrys privatisations. The volume is suitably
captured by the revenue from total sales, which is certainly also a good indicator of the eco-
nomic impact and ﬁnancial success of divestiture. Nevertheless, revenues alone would tend to
overestimate the importance of privatisation in a country that has raised signiﬁcant revenues
through a handful of large ﬂotations. Two brief examples will clarify the importance of having
two complementary measures for quantity. With 40 transactions, Egypt is placed 9th in the
ranking by sales, but only 36th by revenues (see Table 3). In fact, very small POs were typi-
cal, ranging from US$4ml (Alexandria Pharmaceuticals and Chemical Industries) to US$119ml
(Commercial International Bank). The Japanese privatisation programme is instead one of the
most successful in terms of proceeds. With approximately US$110bn, Japan is placed second in
the ranking by revenue. However, Japan has implemented only nine operations: the three large
tranches of NTT - the fourth largest corporation in the world in terms of market capitalisation
in FT 500 1996 - have generated revenues worth US$81bn, accounting for 73% of the total.
The success of these ﬂotations is partly explained by the dimension of the company, and partly
by the positive outlook for the Japanese equity markets in the 1986-88 period, when the NTT
sales occurred. Furthermore, the government still owns 65% of stock, dwarﬁng the 1% held by
foreign investors.
The quantity indicators are useful in providing a ﬁrst measure of the willingness of govern-
ments to privatise and of the economic impact of one countrys privatisations. Nevertheless,
by focusing only on quantity some interesting questions concerning privatisation remain unex-
plained. Did ownership change hands? Was the auctioning of public enterprises designed to
modify prevailing ownership structures?
To address these questions, we apply the ”quality indicator to the countrys privatisations.
Quality is deﬁned by two variables: the country average of the cumulative privatised stock
(STOCK) and the ratio between POs and total sales per country (PO/SALES). The ﬁrst
variable is constructed at the company level. We ﬁrst calculated the cumulative value when
multiple tranches where issued, taking into account whether over allotment options (green shoe)
were exercised; then we averaged it across companies.
the interpretation of the coeﬃcients diﬃcult.
6This variable averages the stakes sold in companies privatised by PO and PS. PS involve
smaller companies often privatised fully and generally under private control after privatisation.
For the whole sample, the average estimated value of a company privatised by PO is US$1.98bn,
whereas by PS it is US$0.47bn. The average stake sold by PO is 53.40% whereas by PS it is
75.54%. POs typically involve larger companies, with the consequence that substantial revenues
can be raised even through small partial sales. The simple mean therefore overestimates the
average amount of stock privatised in a country that has more frequently sold through PSs than
POs but raised more revenues by PO than by PS. In the statistical analysis, we will therefore
use a weighted average stock where the weights are given by the ratios between the revenues
from privatisation, by PO and PS, and total revenues per country. An example would clarify
the working of this weighting procedure. In our sample, a country like Italy has privatised 25
companies (11 by PO and 14 by PS) generating US$30,762ml in revenues. The average stake
sold by PO is 43%, while the one by PS is 82%. The simple mean of privatised stock is 70%.
Given that 80% of proceeds were generated by PO, the weighted average is 50.8%. In this way,
the average privatised stock is closer to the value that, on average, has generated the largest
proportion of revenues.
As shown in the introduction, privatisations are typically partial; STOCK is therefore a
good measure of the willingness of incumbent governments to sell big stakes. Obviously, even
the sale of the majority of stock would not imply that the government relinquished control.
Golden shares or other statutory constraints on shareholders rights may grant the government
veto over some strategic decisions. However, the transfer of the majority of stock is a necessary,
albeit insuﬃcient, condition for genuine privatisation.
Turning to our second quality measure, the proportion of POs against total sales captures
a fundamental feature of privatisation, namely the commitment by the government to consider
security markets as a primary source of equity. In contrast, PS bypass markets allocating
the stock to institutional investors. In this case, political control is de imperio replaced by
private concentrated ownership (Cornelli - Li [8]).3 It is not surprising that PSs are typical
in Latin America where they account for 92% of total operations and have generated 75% of
the proceeds. In addition, countries like Chile and Venezuela have systematically opted for
this privatisation method. On the contrary, POs are concentrated in the Far East, where they
account for 82% of total sales and 96% of total revenues. Japan, Thailand, and Singapore have
privatised only by PO and Korea and Taiwan exhibit very high PO/sales ratios (around 80%)
(see Table 3).
3It has been noted that some privatised companies are publicly traded and have a controlling shareholder.
Nevertheless, a share issue by PO is a necessary, albeit not suﬃcient, condition for the company to be widely
held.
74 The Determinants of Privatisation
Which factors explain privatisation across all countries? This section describes the theoretical
hypotheses that we test. Table 1 summarises the main arguments. The possible determinants
of the quantity and quality of privatisations are classiﬁed into ﬁve groups: (i) politics; (ii) hard
budget constraints; (iii) legal institutions; (iv) stock market liquidity; (v) controls.
Politics. It is often argued that privatisation has a political dimension. Conservative
parties are believed to be more prone to privatise the economy than socialist or christian-
democratic parties. A rationale for this may be the forward-looking behaviour of conservative
governments aiming to gain future support from the constituencies of shareholders of newly
privatised companies. Privatisation may therefore represent a strategy for switching to forms
of popular capitalism, as some recent results predict (Biais - Perotti [3] and Jones et al. [20]).
Alternatively, a left wing party may thwart privatisations because they tend to jeopardise
employment (Boycko - Shleifer - Vishny [6]). In addition, the auctioning of public enterprises
can be structured to hinder future nationalisations by left wing governments (Stiglitz [41]).
Indeed, large share oﬀerings - often with underpricing - tend to create widespread ownership,
increasing the costs of government expropriation.
The political theory of privatisation has the following implications in terms of quantity
and quality: a right wing privatising government should be associated with more sales, lower
revenue due to underpricing, higher percentages of stock sold, and a higher proportion of share
oﬀerings in order to increase the spread of ownership.
Another important facet of the political dimension of privatisation is the governments abil-
ity to marshal the support of investors. This ability is related to many factors, namely the
credibility and reputation of the government, the presence of restraints on policy reversals and
on the implementation of economic policies, etc. Credibility is considered crucial for the ﬁnan-
cial success of privatisation, since it could aﬀect an investors willingness to pay (Kikeri - Nellis
- Shirley [18]). A credible government should therefore be associated with a higher quantity of
privatisations: it should be able to privatise more and to raise more revenue.
As to the eﬀect of credibility on quality, we refer to Perottis theory of partial privatisation
based on strategic commitment. In his model, the structure of the oﬀer conveys information
on the willingness of governments to bear residual risk. Partial privatisations therefore commit
governments not to shift policy in the future. The testable implication of this theory is that a
credible government does not need to signal commitment and will be able to sell larger stakes
in privatised ﬁrms.
Hard budget constraints. Many events may trigger privatisation in a country. However,
8when ﬁscal crises occur, it is increasingly diﬃcult for governments to continue to subsidise
ineﬃcient State-owned enterprises (Dewatripont - Roland [10], LLSV [27], Poterba [36]). Fur-
thermore, countries burdened by public debt may resort to privatisation to reduce interest
payments and improve ﬁscal deﬁcits. Privatisation, indeed, has been often recommended as a
policy of structural adjustment.
A government with hard budget constraints has more incentives to sell; we should therefore
observe more sales, more revenues (since a ﬁnancially distressed government will ﬁrst sell more
proﬁtable companies), and higher stakes sold in countries running high ﬁscal deﬁcits at the
beginning of the privatisation process. Budget constraints should also inﬂuence the choice of
privatisation method. In private sales, big blocks and controlling stakes are often sold to the
private investor (Grossman - Hart [15]). Issues in public markets are instead typically under-
priced (Rock [37]). These arguments suggest that ceteris paribus, if a governments objective is
revenue, we should observe a higher frequency of private sales.
Legal institutions. Diﬀerent legal traditions are also associated with radically diﬀerent
patterns of investor protection and corporate governance around the world. Common law
countries aﬀord extensive legal protection to shareholders and creditors; at the polar opposite,
French civil law countries, such as Italy, protect both classes of investors much less; German
civil law countries lie somewhere in between but are strongly pro-creditors. The legal protection
of investors also aﬀects corporate governance: widespread ownership is positively correlated to
investors protection so that French civil law countries exhibit a higher ownership concentration
and less developed capital markets. Access to external funds - debt or equity - becomes more
diﬃcult the weaker the legal protection a country aﬀords to corporate investors (LLSV [25],
[26]).
An eﬃcient and impartial court system and a low level of corruption are fundamental
ingredients in the deterrence of managerial misconduct. The rights written into legal codes will
obviously be empty threats if the State does not enforce them appropriately. LLSV [26] have
also shown that investor-friendly laws are associated with better enforcement so that investors
in French civil law countries face the most serious risks in terms of expropriation.
Investor protection could particularly inﬂuence the quantity and quality of a countrys pri-
vatisations. First, the market value of a company and consequently its privatisation proceeds
should be lower where legal protection is poor since (i) there will be a lower demand for pri-
vatised equity by minority shareholders and (ii) ﬁrms have diﬃculty raising external debt. In
this context, governments are reluctant to sell big stakes since they know that investors will
discount the risk of being expropriated by the managers of privatised ﬁrms. As a consequence,
privatisation remains partial. Second, if ownership is highly concentrated and ﬁnancial mar-
9kets are small, PS should be more frequent since dominant block-holders will be involved in
the deals and since the absorption capacity of markets is limited.
To summarise, poor legal protection of investors should be associated with lower revenues,
smaller stakes sold, and less privatisations on public equity markets.
Stock market liquidity. The legal variables developed by LLSV are good exogenous proxies
for the size of a countrys capital markets. An important element of ﬁnancial development is still
missing in our analysis: stock market liquidity. Liquidity facilitates diversiﬁcation (Pagano [34],
Levine [28]), information aggregation (Grossman [14]), monitoring of managers (H¨ olmstrom -
Tirole [17], Jensen and Meckling [19]) and regulation (Faure - Grimaud [12]).
These functions of stock market liquidity are natural candidates for the explanation of the
ﬁnancial success of privatisation in terms of proceeds. First, investors require a discount for
shares traded in an illiquid market. Second, by facilitating information aggregation, a liquid
market allows fuller extraction of companys market value from private investors. A higher
stock market liquidity should be therefore associated with higher privatisation revenues.
Furthermore, the ability of a liquid market to monitor managers through informative prices
and the threat of takeover should make governments less reluctant to relinquish control since the
shareholders face less risk of expropriation. This observation has a straightforward implication
in terms of privatised stock: governments operating in economies with liquid markets should
sell higher stakes.
Finally, liquidity should also count in the choice of privatisation method. If a liquid market
is operational when sales occur, it will favour the absorption of big issues, increasing the
likelihood of PO. Alternatively, privatisation in economies with illiquid stock markets could
be designed to foster ﬁnancial development through a sequence of sales, possibly generating a
critical mass eﬀect that could boost liquidity. If this (risky) strategy is implemented, we should
observe a negative relation between the frequency of POs and stock market liquidity.
Controls. Among the possible determinants of privatisation, we include a vector of control
variables. We control for the size of the country by means of the average (natural log of)
GNP in the privatisation period and for the initial conditions in terms of the size of the SOE
sector. These two variables are particularly important when we look for the determinants of
the quantity of privatisations.
We always control for the growth rates of GDP. In the years 1977-1996 the growth rate of
low income economies doubled that of high income economies. East Asia and the Paciﬁc is
the area characterised by the highest GDP growth rate over the whole period (around 7.83%)
followed by South Asia (4.89%) while Europe and Latin America are the areas where GDP
10grew least (0.22% and 2.64% respectively). Diﬀerences in growth rates could inﬂuence both
the quantity and quality of privatisation.
5 Data
To implement the empirical analysis we have built a data set which refers to a broad cross-
section of countries (49), both developed and less developed, observed between 1977 and 1996.
The sample is the same studied by LLSV which identiﬁes countries with some nonﬁnancial
ﬁrms traded on their stock exchanges. The selection of countries is suitable for our purposes
since having a functioning stock market makes relevant the choice of the privatisation method.
Figures 1-4 show the global trend in privatisation and the regional and sectoral breakdown of
sales and revenues.
Privatisation data are obtained from Privatisation International Ltd. that, to our knowl-
edge, is the most comprehensive source of historical data at the company level.4 Our source
reports privatisation transactions worth more than US$500,000. Sample selection bias therefore
becomes the issue.
As far as Italy is concerned, oﬃcial sources report 592 sales worth US$65.2bn during the
period July 1992-December 1997 (see Ministero del Tesoro [33]). For the same period, our
source reports only 49 major deals. In fact, the revenues from those deals amount to US$60.1bn,
approximately 7.9% less than the value from the universe of privatisations. Lopez-de-Silanes
[29] reports 361 non-ﬁnancial privatisations in Mexico during the period 1983-92 with revenue
worth 6.6% of 1992 GDP (US$22.1bn approximately). For the same period, our source reports
only 30 major deals with revenues worth US$21.7bn, approximately 1.8% less than the total
value. Unfortunately, we are unable to extend the analysis of the coverage of our data set due
to lack of information. However these two examples suggest that our sample is representative
of the population of major deals. By the same token, it is clear that our data base is not
suitable for the statistical analysis of small scale operations.
During the period under observation, 1415 major operations were reported (562 public
oﬀers - henceforth POs - and 853 private sales - henceforth PSs) in 101 countries, generating
US$544,513ml in revenues. Again sample selection bias within the Privatisation International
data bank should be limited, since the US$463 bn in revenues raised by countries in our sample
account approximately for 85% of total revenues for the period.
We now describe in detail the independent variables that we use to test the hypotheses
developed in section 4. Deﬁnitions and sources are reported in Table 2.
4The only alternative source which gathers more comprehensive privatisation data worldwide is Securities
Data Corporation, but the period covered is very limited (1996 to date).
11Political variables. To ﬁnd the political determinants of privatisation, we have to identify
privatisation processes implemented by market-oriented (right-wing) governments. Collecting
evidence on the politics of privatisation for a large number of countries is not an easy task.
In most cases, privatisation occurred over a time span that featured changes in the political
regime or coalition realignments. For our purposes, a reasonable proxy can be constructed by
considering which incumbent party has carried out the majority of sales in a country.
In this direction, we have ﬁrst picked from Wilfried Derksens Electoral Web Sites the cate-
gory democratic conservative for the political orientation. Democratic conservative parties are
deﬁned as parties adhering to traditional values in combination with free-market ideology and
law-and-order positions. We then retrieved the political history for our countries from Banks -
Day - Muellers [2] Political Handbook of the World and internet sources identifying privatising
governments supported by democratic conservative parties. For OECD countries up to 1986
we referred to the data in Alesina - Roubini [1].
The dummy RIGHT therefore takes a value of 1 when the majority of privatisations was
implemented by democratic conservative governments, and 0 otherwise.
As to the measurement of a governments credibility in terms of respect to private invest-
ment, we construct a variable (CREDIBILITY) that is an average of the country rankings in
terms of rule of law, risk of expropriation and risk of repudiation of contracts by the govern-
ment. To avoid endogeneity problems, the variable pre-dates the privatisation decision and
refers to the score received by a country the year before the ﬁrst sale.
As stressed in the International Country Risk Guide, a country with an established law and
order tradition has sound political institutions, a strong court system and provisions for an
orderly succession of power. A country where the risk of contract repudiation by the government
is high may initiate a contract modiﬁcation with a foreign business because of an income
drop, budget cutbacks, a change of government or a change in the governments economic and
social priorities. The risk of expropriation of private foreign investment encompasses outright
conﬁscation and forced nationalisation.
Fiscal deﬁcits. To test the hypothesis that hard budget constraints may force governments
to divest SOEs, we introduce the DEFICIT variable, deﬁned as the average of the deﬁcits of
the public sector against GDP in the three years before the ﬁrst privatisation. Although the
very ﬁrst sale might be incidental and not economically signiﬁcant, we prefer this measure to
an average for the whole period which would be spurious since, as we have seen, privatisations
substantially improve deﬁcits.
Some purposely chosen facts demonstrate the role of ﬁscal deﬁcit as an initial condition in
privatisation. Mexico, for instance, experienced a debt crisis in 1982 that prevented it from
12normal borrowing on world capital markets for about seven years. In 1987 the deﬁcit/GDP ratio
was roughly around 14% and the Mexican government launched a macroeconomic stabilisation
policy which included privatisation. In 1988 the ﬁrst oﬀerings took place, raising revenue of
roughly US$1.9bn. The deﬁcit/GDP ratio declined to 9.6% during that year and to 5% the
following year, turning into a surplus in 1992-1993 before the new debt crisis that occurred in
1994. The decline in deﬁcits is partly explained by the rise in privatisation revenues. In the
years 1991 and 1992, they amounted to about US$17.2bn, which accounted for 92% of total
revenues from the privatisation in Mexico, and for 3.5% and 3% of GDP in 1991 and 1992
respectively.
In Egypt, the average annual deﬁcit/GDP ratio was slightly above 6% in the three years
before the announcement of its privatisation programme; the average annual increase in overall
deﬁcit was around 34%. The programme was announced in 1991 but the ﬁrst sale occurred
in 1993. Total revenues from privatisation between 1993 and 1996 amounted to US$1.25bn.
In the same time span, the average annual growth rate of GDP fell from roughly 5.4% to
1.5%. Although the general economic conditions of the country deteriorated, Western creditors
oﬀered additional aid in response to the decision to accelerate the privatisation of State-owned
enterprises and to pursue further economic liberalisation.
Finally, in the years following the ratiﬁcation of the Maastricht Treaty, European countries
might have been forced to accelerate divestiture in order to comply with convergence criteria
(Christodoulakis-Katsoulacos [7], Favero et al. [11]).
Legal variables. To test the eﬀect of legal institutions on privatisations, we use two of the
legal tradition dummies (FRENCH LAW, GERMAN LAW) and the legal protection indicators
developed by LLSV. Legal protection is deﬁned in terms of legal rules and their enforcement.
The antidirector rights index (ANTIDIRECTOR) measures the legal protection that a countrys
company law aﬀords against the risk of expropriation by managers. The variable takes into ac-
count the existence by law of proxy by mail, cumulative voting for directors, oppressed minority
mechanisms, requirements for the deposit of shares prior to general shareholders meeting, the
minimum percentage of shares needed to call an extraordinary meeting at 10% or below, and
the preemptive rights that can be waived only by a shareholders vote. The creditors rights
index (CREDITOR) conveys information about the bankruptcy law of a country and accounts
for the existence of restrictions such as creditors consent to ﬁle for reorganisation, automatic
stay on assets, special rights for secured creditors and management stay on the reorganisation
process. The enforcement of law index (ENFORCE) is the average grade obtained by a country
for the eﬃciency of the judicial system and corruption. The three variables account for the
level of deterrence against managerial misconduct and are all taken from LLSV [27].
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are useful proxies for the size of capital markets. To complete the picture of a countrys ﬁnancial
development we include a measure of stock market liquidity given by the average of total value
traded against GDP (FLOAT). This variable is particularly relevant in the statistical analysis
of revenues and stakes sold.
Controls. We ﬁnally include the following list of control variables. The (natural log of)
average Gross National Product (1977-96) (GNP); the average growth rates of GDP (1970-93)
(GROWTH); the size of the SOE sector in the year before the ﬁrst privatisation (SOE), given
by the average of the share of SOE assets against GDP, the share of SOE in employment and
the share of SOE investment in gross domestic investment against GDP.
5.1 Data description
Figure 1 presents the global trend in privatisation. Table 3 presents the aggregate data on
privatisation processes. Countries are ranked by GNP per capita and classiﬁed into two broad
categories (developed and developing countries) using the median value of the ranking variable
to split the sample.
Six countries of our sample (Switzerland, Hong Kong, Uruguay, Jordan, Ecuador, and
Zimbabwe) never implemented a major privatisation during the 1977-96 period. With the
exception of Switzerland and Hong Kong, they are all developing countries.
As to the number of sales, the developed countries’ average is 25.42, while the correspond-
ing average for developing countries is 16.12. With 148 operations, the UK leads the ranking,
accounting for 14.61% of total sales. European countries appear particularly involved in di-
vestiture: Austria, Germany, France, Italy, and Portugal have implemented from 28 to 48
privatisations. Other wealthy economies like Australia, Canada, and Israel present similar ﬁg-
ures, with an average of 38 of sales. Within the developing countries sub-sample, Turkey leads
the ranking with 53 operations, and some Latin American countries (i.e. Argentina, Peru,
Brazil, and Mexico) have a great bearing on the number of sales. Some African countries are
note-worthy, with Egypt and Nigeria boasting 40 and 19 major privatisations, respectively.
Analysing the sales, the stage of economic development does not appear to be a critical
determinant of the extent of privatisation, but a more exhaustive picture will emerge by looking
at revenues.
Now, the average total revenues for developed countries are around US$18.1bn, and US$3.4bn
for less wealthy economies, with statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences in means (t = -2.31). In
some cases the data on revenues conﬁrm the previous results; not surprisingly, the UK once
again ranks ﬁrst, and the US is second last (before Nigeria) in terms of privatisation proceeds.
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enues from the sales. A higher number of sales sales is also correlated to higher proceeds in some
developing countries such as Mexico and Argentina. But it is also interesting to notice that
the opposite is true for developed countries such as Portugal, Israel, Canada, Australia, and
developing countries (i.e. Peru, Brazil, Egypt, and Turkey). Few sales are instead associated
to substantial revenues in Japan, boasting the highest level of proceeds per sale (US$12.2bn),
and to a smaller extent in Indonesia, Korea, and South Africa.
The quantity of privatisation could be determined by the size of the economy. In Table 3
we report the number of sales and the total revenues suitably scaled by the number of domestic
listed ﬁrms and by the population respectively. (SALES and REVENUES, respectively). These
variables will be used in the regression analysis.
We do not report major diﬀerences in the means between developed and developing coun-
tries. Overall, a large number of sales is associated with higher values of the same variables
scaled by the number of domestic ﬁrms. Wealthy economies like Portugal, Austria, Italy, and
New Zealand still occupy medium-high positions in the ranking, as the US remains last. Nev-
ertheless, some exceptions warrant attention; the UK is now placed only 8th, and Canada and
Germany drop to middle-low positions. Similarly, the picture emerging from the analysis of
sales is conﬁrmed with exceptions for developing countries. Turkey still leads the ranking;
Argentina, Venezuela, Peru, and Mexico report high ratios of the number of privatisations to
domestic ﬁrms. Egypt instead loses the bearing it had on the number of sales.
By comparing aggregate and per capita revenues, the diﬀerence between the two groups
magniﬁes: developed countries report approximately US$747 of average per capita revenues,
while developing countries only US$80, with highly statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences in means
(t = -4.96). In the ﬁrst group, the quantity of privatisation per capita is still very high in
the UK, Australia, Japan, and especially New Zealand; Portugal gains some positions, France,
Italy, Austria, and Germany remain stable. With US$1575 per capita revenues, Singapore now
ranks third. In the second group, Argentina, Mexico, and Peru are in pre-eminent positions,
with Malaysia placed second.
Turning to our quality measures, in advanced economies the (weighted) average percentage
of privatised stock (STOCK) is 60%, while it is 51% in developing countries, with almost
statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences in means. In the ﬁrst group, average privatised stakes are
quite high, and particularly so in common law countries like the US, the UK, New Zealand,
and Australia. With the notable exception of France and Spain, European governments have
on average sold the majority of stock. In developing countries, South Africa and Venezuela
have privatised the largest stakes, while South Korea a bare 16% average.
Privatisations on public equity markets (given by the ratio of public oﬀers to the total
15number of sales, PO/SALES) appear on average more frequent in developed coutries. Japan
and Singapore have always opted for POs; Norway, France, Finland, and Taiwan also exhibit
very high ratios (around 0.9). On the contrary, developing countries - especially Latin American
countries - have typically chosen to privatise through asset sales: Chile and Venezuela have
never implemented a public oﬀer, and Argentina, Mexico, Brazil, Peru exhibit the lowest
PO/Sales ratios.
This data description is obviously unsatisfactory since it focuses on GNP per capita only.
We aim instead at taking into account other determinants of the quality and quantity of
privatisation. In Table 4, we present a more detailed descriptive analysis where the main
explanatory factors are used as ranking variables for our measures on privatisation processes.
These statistics are reported only for the variables we will use in the econometric analysis.
Table 4 shows ﬁrst that the political dummy is positively related to the number of sales
relative to domestic ﬁrms and to the PO/SALES ratio, with statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences
in means. Conservative governments seem to privatise more and appear committed to creat-
ing widespread ownership. Higher deﬁcits are associated with more sales since we report a
statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the means of the ﬁrst and the top quartile of the dis-
tribution of the variable ranked by DEFICIT. This result suggests that hard budget constraints
could be important in explaining the extent of a countrys privatisation. The credibility index
is associated with higher revenues per capita and with a higher percentage of stock sold. This
evidence indicates that sovereign risk may aﬀect revenue generation and a credible governments
commitment to privatise may provide a premium in terms of stock sold. The average stake
sold also seems to be related to the quality of legal protection oﬀered to corporate investors.
The variable ENFORCE - measuring the eﬃciency of the judiciary and level of corruption
- is associated with a higher percentage of privatised stock. The CREDITOR index instead
appears to be negatively related to the two quality measures for the stakes sold. A country
that aﬀords extensive legal protection to creditors seems less willing to privatise large stakes.
Countries with higher stock market liquidity have raised more proceeds from privatisation.
Indeed, the variable FLOAT appears to be positively related to REVENUES. Market liquidity
could allow the seller to extract the full market value of the company and to underprice less.
These preliminary results suggest that our determinants may have some explanatory power,
indicating the need for thorough econometric testing.
6 Empirical Results
Tables 6 to 10 report our estimates of the quantity and quality of privatisation. We use the
following methodology in the empirical test. Multicollinearity problems do not allow the same
16speciﬁcation for all dependent variables, but we include the political dummy (RIGHT), average
ﬁscal deﬁcits the year before the ﬁrst sale (DEFICIT), and a macroeconomic control variable
(GROWTH) in every regression, and include the (natural log of) GNP and the size of the SOE
sector as additional controls where feasible.
When we use the stock market liquidity variables FLOAT, we have to take into account
the possibility that ﬁnancial market liquidity is endogenous to privatisation. A large scale
privatisation process - like the British one for instance - might make a notable contribution to
ﬁnancial market development. We perform IV estimates when the liquidity measure is included
as regressor.
6.1 The Quantity Regressions
Table 5 shows regression results for our ﬁrst measure for the quantity of privatisation operations,
namely the number of sales relative to the number of domestic listed ﬁrms (SALES).
The extent of a countrys privatisation process is largely determined by the governments
budget constraints and political factors. Indeed, countries that have privatised more in terms
of sales had high ﬁscal deﬁcits at the beginning of the privatisation process. The coeﬃcient
of the variable DEFICIT is positive and signiﬁcant, although less so when we control for the
dimension of the SOE sector. These results conﬁrm the widely held view that privatisations
may represent an opportunity for governments to improve the budget by raising revenues.
A ﬁrst indication of the political dimension of privatisation processes is captured by the
dummy RIGHT. We ﬁnd a positive, stable and statistically signiﬁcant relation between the
quantity of sales carried out by governments and the fact that they were supported by conser-
vative coalitions. A theoretical prediction of the Biais - Perotti [3] model is conﬁrmed in our
data: privatisation is indeed more likely to be implemented by right-wing governments, maybe
to increase the support for market-oriented platforms in future elections.
Another striking result from regression analysis is that the extent of a country’s privatisation
is independent from the size of the economy and of the SOE sector. The coeﬃcients for the
(natural log of) GNP and for SOE value added as a percentage of GDP (SOE) are always
unsigniﬁcant. This evidence is in stark contrast with the idea that bigger companies should
privatise more and that the scope of privatisation simply depends upon how many State-owned
companies the government has to sell.
Furthermore, economic growth matters: the number of sales is negatively correlated with
the growth rates of GDP (GROWTH). The coeﬃcient of this variable is always highly statis-
tically signiﬁcant and quite stable also in unreported regressions. Slow-growth countries are
wealthy, mature, OECD economies and those have been particularly involved in privatisation.
In the descriptive analysis, we have shown that also developing economies have a great bear-
17ing on the sales. Nevertheless, the average number of sales as a percentage of the number of
domestic ﬁrms is mainly driven by Turkey. By supressing Turkey as an outlier, the developing
countries average drops to 7.96, which is lower than the corrisponding ﬁgure for developed
economies (9.02).
Revenues per capita (REVENUES) are the second measure for the quantity of a countrys
privatisations; although sales and revenues should explain two facets of the same economic
phenomenon, their determinants are partly diﬀerent. As we have seen, the total number of
sales is explained by political factors and ﬁscal deﬁcits, supporting the view that the extent of
privatisation is strongly inﬂuenced by a governments preferences and budget constraints. Ag-
gregate proceeds instead depend crucially upon demand factors, that is, stock market liquidity
and governments credibility as perceived by investors.
Before presenting the results, some comments about the empirical methodology are due.
Where Revenues per Capita is the dependent variable, we will not use the (natural log of) GNP
as a control variable, being highly correlated with two variables of interest (CREDIBILITY
and the ﬁtted values of FLOAT).
Table 6 shows our estimates for the variable REVENUES. Indeed, capital market liquidity
and credibility explain the volume and the ﬁnancial success of a countrys privatisation plan.
In particular, the coeﬃcients on the measure of market liquidity (FLOAT) have a positive sign
and are statistically signiﬁcant. A standard deviation change in the total value traded over
GDP increases revenues per capita by approximately US$168. These results suggest that stock
market liquidity is a prerequisite for successful privatisations. If capital markets are active and
liquid at the time of privatisation, proceeds will be maximised. This evidence is consistent with
the theoretical literature showing the positive role of liquidity in information aggregation, so
that governments ﬂoating SOEs in liquid markets extract the full market value of the companies
and undeprice shares less. Furthermore, a liquid market allows the absorption of big issues,
facilitating the divestiture of large ﬁrms.
The second important factor to determining the volume and ﬁnancial success of a countrys
privatisation plan is governments credibility. In all the regressions we ran the coeﬃcient esti-
mates are highly signiﬁcant and positive. In particular, a one point increase in the credibility
index increases revenues per capita by an average of approximately US$234. Investors believe
in the governments commitment in countries where the law and order tradition is well estab-
lished and where the risk of policy reversal and expropriation is low. Once again, investors are
led to buy more and governments to underprice less.
By reading the coeﬃcient of the macroeconomic control variables, we ﬁnd that slow-growth
countries exhibit a larger volume of privatisations. This evidence is consistent with previous re-
sults on sales and with the regional distribution of revenues (Figure 3). These are concentrated
18in big and relatively mature Western European countries.
The coeﬃcients on the political dummy and ﬁscal deﬁcits are insigniﬁcant, indicating that
government’s political orientation and ﬁnancial distress play virtually no role in revenue gener-
ation. As in the sales regressions, the size of the SOE sector is useless to explain the quantity
of privatisation. This result provides quite conclusive evidence that having large SOE to sell
is just a necessary but non suﬃcient for large scale divestitures.
6.2 The Quality Regressions
In the introduction we mentioned the fact that privatisations across countries typically appear
to be partial. Obviously, it is diﬃcult to single out which privatisation programmes are still
in the making and which advanced. From the average stakes sold over long periods of time
one can infer the willingness of governments to take a step backwards in the control of SOEs.
We have seen that the extent to which a country privatises essentially depends on the pref-
erence of governments and these might change over time. An interesting question to ask is
whether, despite government preferences, there are economic or institutional impediments to
full privatisation. The results presented in this section set forth some tentative answers.
Where the average stake sold (STOCK) is the dependent variable, we are forced to drop
(as in the REVENUES regressions) the (natural log of) GNP as regressors. We do not lose
information by doing this because we do not have any strong a priori premises about the eﬀect
of the size of the country on privatised stock. By the same token, we do not control for the
size of the SOE sector. The appropriate control variable would be the average stake owned by
government at the beginning of the privatisation process, as initial condition. Unfortunately,
this variable is just available for a handful of countries and therefore could not be used in
econometric testing.
In the sales regression, ﬁscal deﬁcits were shown to be a critical determinant in triggering
privatisation. As shown in Table 7, the coeﬃcient of deﬁcit is also positive and quite signiﬁcant
in the Stock regressions. We further corroborate the importance of public ﬁnance in explaining
not only the quantity but also the quality of privatisation: governments running high ﬁscal
deﬁcits are led to sell larger stakes in SOEs.
Turning to the political credibility of governments, we conﬁrm that this factor does not
only explain the volume and economic impact of privatisation in terms of proceeds but it also
aﬀects the stake sold. The correlation suggested by Perotti [35] is conﬁrmed in our data: when
the credibility constraint is binding governments privatise larger stakes since they need less to
signal commitment. Indeed, the coeﬃcient on the variable CREDIBILITY is positive and close
to signiﬁcance at conventional levels.
Among the institutional factors that may inﬂuence the structure of the sale, legal protection
19warrants attention. The coeﬃcient estimate for shareholder protection is positive and signif-
icant, and especially the quality of enforcement of laws in terms of corruption and eﬃciency
of the judiciary. This indicates that governments should relinquish control more rapidly in
a country where cash ﬂow and control rights are appropriately enforced. When appropriate
legal institutions are not in place and the enforcement is weak, governments may opt for par-
tial privatisations, discounting the risk of entrenchment or expropriation by management that
minority shareholders will face.
Quite surprisingly, the creditor rights index exhibits a statistically signiﬁcant negative re-
lation with the percentage of privatised stock; across unreported regressions, the coeﬃcient
estimates for this variable are remarkably stable. The same negative and statistically signif-
icant relation is found with the German civil law family that - as we have shown - protects
creditors particularly well. Why are the German civil law origin and creditor rights associated
with a lower quality of privatisation and partial sales? A tentative explanation is that these
countries are interventionist but quite eﬃcient in running SOEs so they may be have fewer in-
centives to divest them ([27]). But without controlling properly for proﬁtability, this question
remains unsettled.
The eﬀect of a developed and liquid stock market on the quality of privatisation is particu-
larly striking. The total value of trades against GDP (FLOAT) is positively and signiﬁcantly
correlated with the average stake sold. This evidence indicates clearly that stock market liquid-
ity is critical to achieving full privatisation. A liquid market is a good monitor so governments
will more easily privatise big stakes, and possibly relinquish control, since they are less fearful
that managers of privatised companies will entrench themselves since their performance will be
carefully scrutinised (Faure - Grimaud [12]).
The coeﬃcient on the political dummy is positive and almost signiﬁcant, conﬁrming the view
that also the quality of privatisation has a political determinant: market-oriented governments
privatise larger stakes.
Finally, the coeﬃcients of growth rates of GDP are highly signiﬁcant and negative. Com-
bining this evidence with the high correlation of the size of the country measured by the log
of GNP with CREDIBILITY and FLOAT (0.48 and 0.91), one can conclude that larger and
more mature countries in terms of economic development tend to privatise higher percentages
of stock.
The decision to let the SOEs go public or to sell them via a private placement is directly
related to a governments privatisation objectives. Large ﬂotations may be useful to spread
shareholding and to develop capital markets. However, the ﬁnancial success of the issue could be
inﬂuenced by a number of factors, like the capability of advisors in the share-pricing decisions,
the deﬁciencies in exchange rate rules and regulations, inadequate legal protection for investors,
20the presence of a distorting tax system and government credibility (Roell [38]). Auctioning
control directly to private investors is certainly a safer strategy for revenue maximisation. When
choosing the privatisation method, governments trade-oﬀ the political beneﬁts of spreading
ownership with the opportunity costs of lower proceeds.
The empirical analysis of the PO/SALES ratio clearly shows that this trade-oﬀ exists. The
results in Table 8 clearly indicate that ﬁnancially distressed governments are probably forced
to choose the PS method to maximise the proceeds and alleviate the public budget. Indeed,
the coeﬃcient of the ﬁscal deﬁcit at the beginning of the process is positive and signiﬁcant
across several speciﬁcations, especially when we control for the size of the SOE sector and legal
origin.
But the choice of the privatisation method is also related to the political objectives of
privatisation: conservative coalitions seem particularly inclined to let State-owned ﬁrms go
public. The coeﬃcient of our political variable (RIGHT) is highly signiﬁcant and has a positive
sign. Recalling the evidence on sales regressions, conservative coalitions are not only more
prone to privatise but also more inclined to choose public oﬀerings. As stressed by the recent
literature on the political economy of privatisations (Biais-Perotti [3]), the rationale for this
preference could lie in the belief that classes of shareholders might vote with the right in the
future, contributing to the success of conservative parties at general elections.5
The econometric analysis conﬁrms the results of the descriptive analysis in Table 4. French
civil law countries reluctantly choose POs, and are therefore more prone to sell shares privately
to hard-core investors. This evidence can be explained by the fact that in French civil law
countries capital markets are smaller and unable to absorb big issues by PO. Furthermore, in
those countries share ownership is highly concentrated with the result that the same corporate
governance structure is replicated in privatised ﬁrms. Indeed, if large domestic block-holders
prevail, privatisations are more likely to be implemented by PS to local institutional investors.
7 Conclusions
This paper has presented comprehensive evidence about privatisation processes around the
world. The scope of divestiture is shown to be independent of the size of government in the
economy but determined by a variety of political, institutional, and economic factors. First,
politics and government budget constraints play crucial roles in the decision to privatise and
5Our political variable is deﬁned as the party that has privatised more during the period under scrutiny. This
raises the possibility that the incumbent party may have been endogenous to the number of POs: the more a
country has privatised via PO, the more likely it is that a conservative coalition is incumbent since its platforms
could be supported by the shareholders of privatised ﬁrms. To test for possible simultaneity between PO and
RIGHT, we have performed an Hausman [16] test: with 96% percent conﬁdence, we could not reject the null
hypothesis of exogeneity of the political variable.
21in the choice of the privatisation method. Second, stock market liquidity, the legal protection
of investors, and institutional credibility are fundamental in explaining the amount of revenues
raised from the sales and the size of privatised stakes.
The paper might be improved and extended in a number of directions. In order to identify
more precisely the factors eﬀecting the willingness of investors to pay for privatised shares
by investors, we should build price-to-book indicators also controlling for proﬁtability. The
problem is that balance sheet data for non-listed companies privatised by PS are not available
from centralised sources.
We would also like to have more data about other institutional aspects of the oﬀer. From
our database we are able to retrieve some information about the presence of constraints such as
special shares, limits on the presence of international capital, and preemptive rights awarded to
some classes of investors. Nevertheless, we suspect a possible source for sample selection bias
since some countries may not disclose relevant information due to diﬀerent ﬁnancial market
regulations. We leave all this for future research.
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25Table 1. Theoretical Predictions about the Determinants of the Quantity and Quality of Privatisations
(expected sign of the coefficients in parentheses)
Dependent variables
QUANTITY QUALITY






“Privatisation is more likely to




“Right wing governments are
more likely to underprice shares”




fraction of share ownership
to the population” (Biais
and Perotti 1999)
(+)
Right wing governments should
choose POs to widen share
ownership and increase the





Privatisation is more feasible
if private investment will not
be expropriated ex post.
(+)
By the same token, a lower
country-risk increases investor
confidence and willingness to pay




does not need to signal
commitment through






deficits have more incentives
to privatise (Dewatripont and
Roland 1993, LLSV 1999)
(+)
By the same token, financially
distressed governments should









governments tend to sell control
to the buyer: PS are chosen to
avoid underpricing and maximise




SALES REVENUES STOCK PO/SALES
Independent variables




The market value of the company and
consequently privatisation proceeds are
higher in countries where the law affords
protection to minority shareholders (LLSV
1998)
(+)
If shareholders are protected by law,
benevolent governments are less reluctant
















If governments care about legal protection
of creditors of privatised companies,  they




The quality of the enforcement of law is
crucial to effective investor protection
(LLSV 1998). The market value of the
company and consequently privatisation
proceeds are higher where courts are
efficient and corruption not widespread.
(+)
If shareholder rights are strongly enforced,
benevolent governments are less reluctant
to sell big stakes and to relinquish control
 (+)
The enforcement of




















(Holmstrom and Tirole 1993,
Pagano 1993, etc.). Privatisation on
liquid markets allows  governments
to extract more fully the market
value of the company and to
maximise proceeds.
(+)
Liquid markets perform monitoring
well (Faure-Grimaud 1999):
benevolent governments relinquish
control more rapidly if managers of
privatised companies will not entrench.
Alternatively, self-interested
governments with hard budget
constraints will have more incentives to
sell higher stakes in liquid markets in
order to raise revenue
(+)
Liquid markets alllow to
absorb big issues more
easily. Therefore POs are
more feasible (+)Table 2. Description of the Variables
VARIABLE Description
Total Sales Total number of privatisations by Public Oﬀer (PO) and Private Sales (PS)
implemented in the 1977-96 period.
Source:Privatisation International, International Financial Statistics
SALES Total Sales as a percentage of the number of domestic listed ﬁrms (1986-93).
Source:Privatisation International, International Financial Statistics
Total Revenues Total revenues from privatisations implemented in the 1977-96 period
(billion US Dollars 1996).
Source: Privatisation International, World Development Indicators
REVENUES Ratio of Total Revenues to the average population (1977-96).
Source: Privatisation International, World Development Indicators
STOCK Weighted average of privatised stock by PO and PS at the company
level in the period 1977-96 (the weights are the proportion of revenues by PO
and PS on total revenues respectively).
Source: Privatisation International
PO/SALES Ratio of the number of Public Oﬀers (PO) to the total
number of sales implemented in the 1977-96 period.
Source: Privatisation International
RIGHT Dummy taking the value 1 if the majority of total sales is implemented by
a democratic-conservative party and 0 otherwise.
Source: Privatisation International, Banks, Day, Muller [2],
Wilfried Derksens Electoral Web Sites
CREDIBILITY Average scores on the rule of law, risk of expropriation and
risk of contract repudiation by government in the year before the ﬁrst sale.
Source: International Country Risk Guide
DEFICIT Average deﬁcit of the public sector on GDP in the three years before the ﬁrst sale.
Source: World Tables (1995) and Privatisation International
COMMON LAW Dummy for common law countries
Source: LLSV [25]
FRENCH LAW Dummy for French civil Law countries
Source: LLSV [25]
GERMAN LAW Dummy for German civil law countries
Source: LLSV [25]
ANTIDIRECTOR Antidirector rights index
Source: LLSV [25]
CREDITOR Creditors rights index
Source: LLSV [25]
ENFORCE Averages of scores on the eﬃciency of the judicial system and corruption (1982-95)
Source: Business International Co. and International Country Risk Guide
FLOAT Ratio of the average total value of trades on the major stock exchange
to GDP (1986-93).
Source: Demirguc-Kunt and Levine [9]
Log of GNP Log of the average Gross National Product (1977-96)
Source: World Development Indicators
GROWTH Average annual percent growth of GDP per capita, 1970-93
Source: World Tables (1995)
SOE Average of 1) the share of SOE assets on GDP, 2) the share of SOE
in employment and 3) the share of SOE investment in gross domestic
investment on GDP in the year before the ﬁrst privatisation, where available
Source: World Bank [43]Table 3. Privatisation around the World
COUNTRY Total SALES Total REVENUES STOCK PO/SALES RIGHT
Sales Revenues
Japan 9 0.44 109565 883.71 0.55 1.00 1
Switzerland 0 0.00 0 0.00 . . 1
Denmark 6 2.25 4448 854.72 0.53 0.67 0
USA 2 0.03 347 1.31 1.00 0.00 0
Norway 8 1.64 1585 366.65 0.53 0.88 0
Germany 37 6.72 17336 215.28 0.68 0.14 1
Austria 28 30.98 4598 585.01 0.54 0.71 1
France 38 5.93 40971 717.50 0.50 0.84 1
Sweden 9 6.79 9005 1034.26 0.62 0.67 1
Belgium 9 4.95 4844 479.36 0.51 0.11 0
Singapore 10 1.43 4572 1574.90 0.28 1.00 0
Netherlands 16 7.08 11610 761.07 0.60 0.38 0
Hong Kong 0 0.00 0 0.00 . . .
Canada 44 3.94 13351 474.87 0.67 0.48 1
Italy 44 19.43 30762 540.63 0.51 0.48 0
Finland 17 27.42 3164 626.75 0.56 0.88 1
Australia 34 2.87 22311 1262.32 0.89 0.29 1
UK 148 7.66 113819 1986.82 0.96 0.41 1
Ireland 8 10.13 1730 484.76 0.62 0.38 1
Israel 36 11.54 3542 707.30 0.45 0.50 0
New Zealand 24 18.97 9618 2752.99 0.90 0.08 0
Spain 17 4.44 11179 286.20 0.38 0.59 0
Portugal 48 32.71 10930 1103.37 0.70 0.54 1
Taiwan 18 9.14 5196 248.39 0.32 0.89 0
Developed
Countries avg 25.42 9.02 18103.46 747.84 0.60 0.51 0.52
Argentina 50 26.76 16598 486.91 0.55 0.12 0
South Korea 5 1.72 2546 57.69 0.16 0.80 1
Greece 18 14.24 1715 164.84 0.65 0.11 1
Uruguay 0 0.00 0 0.00 . . 0
Mexico 32 13.42 22793 261.44 0.60 0.09 0
Malaysia 20 10.36 6402 343.38 0.45 0.45 1
Chile 8 3.55 604 44.24 0.31 0 0
Brazil 41 7.09 10781 70.18 0.72 0.07 0
Turkey 53 58.16 2000 33.98 0.63 0.06 1
South Africa 3 0.52 1401 37.72 0.79 0.67 1
Venezuela 18 22.02 2157 100.91 0.80 0 0
Thailand 7 3.33 862 14.89 0.26 1.00 1
Peru 48 31.55 6872 294.24 0.76 0.04 1
Colombia 3 3.47 722 19.09 0.67 0.67 1
Jordan 0 0.00 0 0.00 . . 0
Ecuador 0 0.00 0 0.00 . . 0
Indonesia 5 5.52 3271 17.28 0.26 0.80 1
Philippines 10 6.18 1799 26.78 0.57 0.40 0
Egypt 40 7.38 1249 21.48 0.45 0.83 1
Sri Lanka 4 2.23 63 3.52 0.72 0.50 1
Zimbabwe 0 0.00 0 0.00 . . 0
Pakistan 5 2.02 1319 11.04 0.30 0.40 0
India 6 0.13 2720 2.95 0.29 0.83 1
Nigeria 19 15.11 32 0.30 0.43 1.00 1
Kenya 8 14.55 118 4.79 0.31 0.75 1
Developing
Countries avg 16.12 9.97 3440.96 80.71 0.51 0.38 0.56
Test of Means
(t-statistics) -1.32 0.29 -2.31 -4.96 -1.57 -1.21 0.26Table 4. Bivariate Statistics
Ranking Variables SALES REVENUES STOCK PO/SALES
RIGHT
Right=1 0.12 399.65 0.56 0.57
Right=0 0.07 435.23 0.55 0.31
Test of means -1.35 0.21 -0.29 -2.80
(t-statistic)
DEFICIT
Bottom 25% 0.04 416.88 0.50 0.39
Top 25% 0.10 356.51 0.53 0.45
Test of means -1.79 0.33 -0.40 -0.41
(t-statistic)
CREDIBILITY
Bottom 25% 0.12 74.19 0.47 0.34
Top 25 % 0.06 165.58 0.61 0.37
Test of means 1.09 -3.21 -2.00 -0.21
(t-statistic)
FLOAT
Bottom 25% 0.18 193.77 0.56 0.37
Top 25% 0.06 362.96 0.54 0.45
Test of means 2.02 -0.98 0.16 -0.51
(t-statistic)
ANTIDIRECTOR
Bottom 25% 0.11 266.27 0.62 0.14
Top 25% 0.02 319.87 0.62 0.35
Test of means 2.42 -0.21 0.01 -1.57
(t-statistic)
CREDITOR
Bottom 25% 0.12 263.81 0.71 0.29
Top 25% 0.11 50.45 0.42 0.53
Test of means 0.09 1.56 3.53 -1.73
(t-statistic)
ENFORCE
Bottom 25% 0.13 70.72 0.51 0.42
Top 25% 0.09 826.98 0.67 0.45
Test of means 0.72 -3.23 -2.08 -0.18
(t-statistic)
SOE
Bottom 25% 0.07 440.70 0.59 0.40
Top 25% 0.09 157.21 0.48 0.50
Test of means -0.34 1.90 1.36 -0.68
(t-statistic)Table 5. The Quantity Regressions:
Privatisations/Domestic Firms
The dependent variable SALES is given by the number of privatisations (PO and PS) in a
given country in the 1977-96 period as a percentage of the average number of domestic listed















Adj. R2 0.0200 0.0284
Nobs. 47 43
NOTE - * Statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level; ** Statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level; *** Statistically
signiﬁcant at the 1% level.Table 6. The Quantity Regressions:
Revenues per Capita
The dependent variable REVENUES is given by the ratio of the total revenues from pri-
vatisations (PO and PS) in a given country in the 1977-96 period to the average population
(1977-96). We use IV estimates when the measure for ﬁnancial market liquidity (FLOAT) is
included. The instruments are the aggregate savings 1993, the score in terms of the enforce-
ment of laws and average growth rates. White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors
are reported in brackets.
Independent Dependent Variable:
Variables REVENUES
INTERCEPT 84.5759 716.614*** 955.298***
(226.063) (220.034) (264.138)
GROWTH -122.123*** -140.160*** -171.313***
(35.3976) (43.6979) (44.3067)
DEFICIT -1535.66 -288.920 -1896.99
(1204.23) (1375.22) (1206.87)








Adj. R2 0.2766 0.1107 0.1681
Nobs. 43 40 36
NOTE - * Statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level; ** Statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level; *** Statistically
signiﬁcant at the 1% level.Table 7. The Quality Regressions:
The Privatised Stock
The dependent variable STOCK is given by the weighted average of privatised stock by PO
and PS at the company level per country in the 1977-96 period, where the weights are the
proportion of revenues by PO and PS on total revenues, respectively. We use IV estimates
when the measure for ﬁnancial market liquidity (FLOAT) is included. The instruments are
the aggregate savings 1993, the score in terms of the enforcement of laws and average growth
rates. White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in brackets.
Independent Dependent Variable:
Variables STOCK
INTERCEPT 0.5756*** 0.3754*** 0.6921***
(0.0956) (1283) (0.1171)
GROWTH -0.0538*** -0.0302 -0.0672***
(0.0161) (0.0188) (0.0171)
DEFICIT 0.7599 0.8809* 0.4066
(0.5862) (0.4934) (0.6333)
















Adj. R2 0.1927 0.3357 0.2433
Nobs. 42 41 37
NOTE - * Statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level; ** Statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level; *** Statistically
signiﬁcant at the 1% level.Table 8. The Quality Regressions:
Privatisations on Public Equity Markets
The dependent variable PO/SALES is given by the ratio of privatisation by Public Oﬀer (PO)
to total sales per country in the 1977-96 period. White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard



















Adj. R2 0.2167 0.2574
Nobs. 47 43
NOTE - * Statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level; ** Statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level; *** Statistically
signiﬁcant at the 1% level. .